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I. INTRODUCTION
During the period between Pennoyer v. Neff (1877)1 and Shaffer v,
Heitner (1977),2 the Supreme Court authorized state courts to assert in
personam jurisdiction over any person served with process in the forum
and in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction over any properly attached
property in the forum. The analytical framework developed in
Pennoyer3 and its progeny,4 rather than the holdings of the cases,' pro-
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. "From our perspective, the importance of Pennoyer is not its result, but the fact that its
principles and corollaries derived from them became the basic elements of the constitutional doc-
trine governing state-court jurisdiction." Id. at 198-99. See also Hazard, A General Theory of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241.
4. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), a quasi in rem case applying the presence-power
doctrine of Pennoyer, was considered in detail by the Court in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 200-01, 208-09.
Other in rem and quasi in rem progeny of Pennoyer cited by the Court in Shaffer were: Huron
Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921); Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Hostetter,
240 U.S. 620 (1916); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Deer, 200 U.S.
176 (1906); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry., 130 U.S. 559 (1889);
Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886); Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F.Supp. 1004 (D. Del.
1972), rev'd, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
5. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), Neff, a Californian, filed suit in Oregon against
Pennoyer seeking recovery of a tract of land in Oregon. Neff based his prevailing claim on a
patent issued to him by the United States. Pennoyer claimed superior title by virtue of a later
purchase of the property at a sheriff's sale in execution on a judgment a third person, Mitchell,
had obtained several years earlier in a quasi in rem proceeding against Neff. In sustaining Neff's
claim to the property, the Court held that the judgment Mitchell had obtained, the basis of the
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vided the foundation for a presence-power doctrine of state judicial
jurisdiction. In essence, Pennoyer stood for the proposition that physi-
cal presence of a defendant in a state gave that state's courts the power
to adjudicate a claim against the defendant even though the asserted
claim was unrelated to the state.6 Pennoyer also came to mean that
presence of property in the state gave that state's courts the power to
adjudicate claims against the property's absent owner even though the
asserted claim was unrelated to the state or to the property itself.7  In
suits based on the presence of property, courts limited recovery to the
value of the property.8
State courts found the requirement of physical presence as a condi-
sheriffs sale, was rendered by the Oregon court without jurisdiction. Since the court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over Neff, the only basis of its power in the proceeding brought by Mitchell was
the property Neff owned in Oregon. Mitchell, who followed the directions of the existing Oregon
statutes, had failed to attach the property in question at the time he commenced his action against
Neff. That failure was deemed fatal because, with neither Neff nor his property before it, the
Oregon court had no basis for assertingjurisdiction over Mitchell's claim against Neff. Id. at 720.
Had Mitchell attached the property when he filed his suit, the earlier proceeding in Oregon would
have been proper and Neff would have failed in his effort to reclaim the property. Further, Neff
would have to have been given proper notice of the earlier Oregon proceeding. See, e.g., Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
6. "[Ulnder Pennoyer state authority to adjudicate was based on the jurisdiction's power
over either persons or property." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977). See, e.g., Grace v.
MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (service made in airspace over Arkansas on a
nonstop flight from Memphis, Tennessee to Dallas, Texas); Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A.
714 (1895) (suit on an English judgment based on service on an American defendant temporarily
in England, jurisdiction of English court sustained); Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265 N.Y. 204, 192
N.E. 294 (1934).
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90,
91... . The sovereignty of the state extends only as far as its territorial boundaries.
Where there is "bodily presence" within the boundaries of the state there is opportunity
for the exercise of the state's sovereignty, even though bodily presence is not accompa-
nied by any intention to remain there permanently.
Jd. at 208, 192 N.E. at 295-96. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
28 (1971).
7. E.g., Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958
(1974); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The presence-
power doctrine did not go unchallenged in the courts. In his concurring opinion in Jonnet v.
Dollar Say. Bank of New York, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976), Judge Gibbons said that Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-55 (1958), "strongly suggests" that "it would be fundamentally unfair
to subject a defendant who has no connection with the state to jurisdiction at the place of plain-
tiffs residence." 530 F.2d at 1142. The Jonnet case involved a successful due process attack on
Pennsylvania's foreign attachment procedures. See also ShatTer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 205
(1977) (citing diverse authorities critical of "the proposition that the presence of property in a
State gives that State jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to the property regardless of the relationship
of the underlying dispute and the property owner to the forum").
8. If jurisdiction is based on the court's power over property within its territory, the
action is called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." The effect of a judgment in such a case is
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tion precedent to assertion of in personam jurisdiction too narrow.
Thus, although physical presence of the defendant remained one basis
for in personam jurisdiction,9 a substantial number of other relation-
ships supported it as well. Distinctions were made between the
"broad" power of state courts to adjudicate claims unrelated to the fo-
rumt°0 and their "limited" authority to adjudicate claims having some
nexus with the forum.' Courts had "broad" jurisdiction over defen-
dants who were domiciliaries of the forum 2 or engaged in continuing
activities there. 3 Corporate defendants were subjected to "broad" ju-
limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a personal liability
on the property owner, since he is not before the court.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977). See, e.g., Martin v. Better Taste Popcorn Co., 89
F.Supp. 754 (S.D. Iowa 1950); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671,
287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967).
9. See note 6 supra.
10. E.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (suit in Ohio against a foreign
corporation on a claim that arose from activities entirely distinct from the corporation's activities
in Ohio); Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973). In Cornelison v. Chancy, 16
Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264,127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976), the court found the relationship the defendant
trucker had with the forum-20 trips a year into the state, an independent contractor relationship
with a California broker, and a Public Utilities Commission license-was insufficient to support
the assertion of "broad" jurisdiction over defendant for injuries plaintiff's decedent received in a
highway accident in Nevada. The fact that at the time of the accident, defendant was en route to
California with a load and was to pick up a load upon arrival was sufficient to support "limited"
jurisdiction for injuries received during the trip, even though the injuries to the California dece-
dent occurred in Nevada.
11. E.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 38 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977)
(asserting "limited" jurisdiction to determine an absent defendant's obligation to support his chil-
dren as the result of his having honored his minor daughter's request that she be permitted to live
with her mother in California), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978); Longines-Wittnauer v. Barnes &
Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1965).
12. E.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.2d 306,
259 P.2d 905 (1953); Mounts v. Mounts, 181 Neb. 542, 149 N.W.2d 435 (1967); Rawstorne v.
Maguire, 265 N.Y. 204, 192 N.E. 294 (1934) (dictum).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 (1971) states that a person is subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which he or she resides. To the extent that residence
is a single-factor sufficient to permit assertions of state-court jurisdiction, the comments about
single-factor bases of jurisdiction in this article are intended to apply. Id, Reporter's Note; see
State ex rel Merritt v. Heffernan, 142 Fla. 496, 501, 195 So. 145, 147-48 (1940); Lebel v. Reagan,
159 Me. 300, 302, 192 A.2d 28, 30 (1963).
Federal jurisdiction may be asserted over citizens of the United States who are nonresidents.
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). While the present article deals only with state-
court jurisdiction, the due process requirements discussed as they relate to single-factor bases of
jurisdiction would seem to question the citizenship rule of Blackmer to the extent that citizenship,
in and of itself, permits the assertion of "broad" jurisdiction over absent defendants. For in-
stance, may the federal courts assert jurisdiction over an American citizen involved in an automo-
bile accident in France in which a French citizen was injured?
13. E.g., Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Lee v. Walworth Valve Co.,
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risdiction in their state of incorporation' 4 and in states in which they
had appointed agents for service.' 5 In each of these situations, a single
factor closely related to presence in the forum was the touchstone of
state judicial jurisdiction. If the single factor existed, the propriety of
exercising state judicial power followed automatically. In addition, a
defendant could consent to the assertion of jurisdiction. 6
When the various single-factor bases of jurisdiction proved too re-
strictive, courts developed a multiple-factor foundation for in per-
sonam jurisdiction over absent defendants. "Limited" jurisdiction
became available on claims stemming from defendant's isolated acts in
the forum state' 7 and on claims arising from acts outside the forum if
482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260
N.Y.S.2d 625 (1968); Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977);
Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971) (suit in Utah against a Texas corporation
for breach of an Alaska employment contract).
It may be that continuing activities, rather than being classified as a single-factor basis ofjuris-
diction, should be viewed as being founded on minimum contacts. The Perkins Court stated that
the basic issue was one of "general fairness to the corporation" and that the "[a]ppropriate tests
for that are discussed in International Shoe ... " 342 U.S. at 445. The continuing activities doc-
trine is treated as a single-factor basis of jurisdiction here because of the similarity between "con-
tinuing activities" and the "presence" required by Pennoyer. Additionally, "broad" jurisdiction is
conferred as it is when "presence" is the basis of jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that Perkins
was not cited by the Court in Shaffer.
14. Eg., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,735 (1877) (dictum). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1971); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 909, 919 (1960).
15. E.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) (in ob-
taining a license to do business in Missouri, defendant insurance company filed a power of attor-
ney with a Missouri state official consenting that service on the official would be deemed service
on the company; the Court held that such service conferred jurisdiction on the Missouri courts to
adjudicate a claim arising out of an insurance policy which the out-of-state company had issued to
an Arizona corporation on a building in Colorado). Cf. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623
(1935) (sustaining the jurisdiction of the Iowa courts on the basis of service on an agent of the
individual defendant, a New Yorker, who, through agents, carried on the business of selling secur-
ities in Iowa; the agent's only express power was to sell securities and the claim sued on arose out
of the business activities in Iowa). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 44
(1971).
16. E.g., National Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964); Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927); Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., 258 N.W.2d 317, 329 (Iowa
1977); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 225 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931). See also D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (holding that confession of judgment clauses are not per se viola-
tive of due process); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Erzine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1969) (holding that jurisdiction based on consent in a cognovit note requires that a "given"
court be designated and that the judgment be rendered in a judicial proceeding).
17. Eg., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); A. F. Briggs Co. v. Starrett Corp., 329 A.2d 177, 181-84 (Me.
1974); Smith v. Tempco, Inc., 252 So.2d 212 (Miss. 1971); Jarstad v. National Farmers Union
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defendant purposefully 18 caused an effect in the forum.19  The multi-
ple-factor basis of jurisdiction derived from the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in International Shoe Co. v. Washington20  and McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co. 21 In tandem, these cases established a
basic due process requirement that state court assertions of in per-
sonam jurisdiction over absent defendants must accord defendants fair
play and substantial justice;22 to meet the fairness-justice standard, the
events and parties involved in the litigation must have at least mini-
mum contacts with the forum.23 Until the decision in Shaffer v.
Heitner,24 the substantial justice and minimum contacts requirement
had almost no impact on the presence-power doctrine of Pennoyer or
on other single-factor bases of jurisdiction developed after Pennoyer.
II. THE HOLDING IN SHA4FFER
With its decision in Shaffer, the Court eliminated one-half of the
Prop. & Cas. Co., 92 Nev. 380, 387-88, 552 P.2d 49, 53-54 (1976); Commonwealth v. National
Fed'n of the Blind, 471 Pa. 529, 370 A.2d 732 (1977) (mail solicitation of funds in Pennsylvania
held suflicient contact to sustain jurisdiction); Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp. v. Smith, 114 R.I.
181, 330 A.2d 804 (1975); Booth v. Magee Carpet Co., 548 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 1976).
18. E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant, "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant pur-
posefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.").
19. E.g., Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969); Reilly v.
Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F.Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974) (plaintiff purchased a General Motors
car from a dealer in Wisconsin, the car containing a defective jack sold by General Motors to the
Wisconsin dealer, plaintiff was injured while using the jack in New Jersey; the court held that the
Wisconsin dealer was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in New Jersey on the theory that the
use of the jack in New Jersey was reasonably foreseeable); Gray v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Edmundson v. Miley Trailer Co., 211
N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1973); Engineering Assoc. of New England v. B & L Liquidating Corp,, 115
N.H. 508, 345 A.2d 900 (1975); Parke-Bernet Galleries v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506,
308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970); State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448
P.2d 571 (1968); Jasper Aviation, Inc. v. McCollum Aviation, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1972);
Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974).
20. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The Court in Shaffer referred to McGee as tile "culmination of
[the International Shoe] trend toward expanding state jurisdiction over 'foreign corporations and
other nonresidents.'" 433 U.S. 186, 204 n. 19 (1977).
22. [Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."
326 U.S. at 316.
23. Id; see 355 U.S. at 222.
24. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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presence-power doctrine.25  It held the presence of property in the fo-
rum insufficient, as a single factor, to permit the assertion of quasi in
rem jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to the forum.26  For a court to
assert such jurisdiction, Shaffer required a multiple-factor analysis. In
addition to the presence of the property, the litigation and the defend-
ant now must have sufficient contact with the forum to permit it to
assert personal jurisdiction over the absent property owner.
Shaffer involved a quasi in rem proceeding in which the state used
sequestered shares of stock in a Delaware corporation 27 as the jurisdic-
tional base for a claim against the nonresident owners of the
shares--officers and members of the board of directors of the corpora-
tion. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants, in their status as officers
and directors, had violated their duties to the corporation by taking
action outside of Delaware that resulted in corporate liability in a pri-
vate antitrust action. The Court held that the single factor of the pres-
ence of the absent defendants' property in Delaware was insufficient to
sustain the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction; to assert such jurisdic-
tion, a state must have sufficient contact with the litigation and the
defendant to permit it to assert personal jurisdiction over the absent
defendant.28
The specific impact of Shaffer is relatively clear. In states that ex-
tend judicial jurisdiction as far as the Constitution permits, 29 a plaintiff
25. The Court noted two exceptions to its holding abolishing the property half of the pres-
ence-power doctrine: (1) Attachments are permissible in a state in which the owner is not subject
to personal jurisdiction "as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation
can be maintained consistently with International Shoe." Id. at 210. The attachment, of course,
must satisfy the requirements of due process as established in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 433 U.S. at 210
n.36. Such an attachment process was used in Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 46
U.S.L.W. 2914 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a post-Shaffer case. (2) "Once it has been determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no
unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has prop-
erty, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an
original matter." 433 U.S. at 210 n.38. For a discussion of the "judgment" rule of Shaffer, see
Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: .4 Preliminary Inquiry into the Impact ofShaffer v. Heitner, 63
IowA L. Rtv. 997, 1007-08 (1978).
26. 433 U.S. at 209.
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975).
28. The judgment in the private antitrust action was for $13,146,090 plus attorneys' fees. 433
U.S. at 190 n.2. The fines totalled $600,000. Id. at n.3.
29. In California and Rhode Island, the long-arm statutes specifically extend the jurisdiction
of the courts as far as permitted by the United States Constitution. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
410.10 (Deering 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1970). Utah's long-arm statute states that it
Number 2] 279
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who is unable to obtain personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant
will be unable to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by virtue of the pres-
ence of the defendant's property in the forum.30 In such states, the
utility of quasi in rem jurisdiction will be curtailed substantially.3 t In
other states, quasi in rem jurisdiction may be asserted despite an inabil-
ity to obtain personal jurisdiction over the absent owner if it is the fo-
rum's limited long-arm statute32 rather than a constitutional inhibition
"should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause of the . . . United States Constitution." UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-27-22 (Supp. 1975). Further, the long-arm statutes in several states have been interpreted by
courts as extending their jurisdiction to its constitutional limit. E.g., Schoel v. Sikes Corp., 533
F.2d 930, 933 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing Alabama's long-arm statute); Interstate Paper Corp. v.
Air-O-Flex Equip. Co., 426 F. Supp. 1323, 1324-25 (S.D. Ga. 1977) ("The Georgia Long Arm
statute is coterminous with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the policy of
the courts of this State is to exercise jurisdiction thereunder 'to the maximum extent permitted by
procedural due process.' "); Jarstad v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 92 Nev. 380,
387, 552 P.2d 49, 53 (1976); Olmstead v. American Granby Co., 565 P.2d 108, 114 (Wyo. 1977).
30. See, e.g., DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 898 (3d Cir. 1977) (referring to
Shaffer's endorsement of the view "that quasi in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate is subject to the
same due process limitations as is in personam jurisdiction."); Inland Credit Corp. v. M/T Bow
Egret, 556 F.2d 756, 757 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating the holding in Shaffer as being "that states'
assertion of in rem jurisdiction must satisfy the same 'minimum contacts standard' applied to in
personam jurisdiction"). See also Pavlo v. James, 437 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (in
holding that on the facts presented it would not exercise jurisdiction under New York's long-arm
statute, the court indicated that it was exercising restraint "in light of the new caution currently
being portrayed in measuring the constitutionality of assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
general," and cited Shaffer.
The pre-Shaffer practice of some states of asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction by permitting
residents to attach a nonresident's property right in a liability insurance policy when the claim
asserted had no contact with the forum, e.g., Savchuk v. Rush, 245 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976);
Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), is no longer permissible
after Shaffer. E.g., Attanasio v. Ferre, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Wallace v. Target Store,
Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399
N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct.
1977). Contra, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Savchuk
was remanded by the United States Supreme Court "for further consideration in light of Shaffer P.
Heitrner. . . ." 433 U.S. 902, 902 (1977).
31. Because the constitutional ability to obtain in personam jurisdiction appears to be a con-
dition precedent to assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction, and because quasi in rem recoveries are
limited by the value of the property attached, see note 8 supra, it is difficult to understand what, if
anything, plaintiffs would gain by proceeding quasi in rem in a state with the broadest form of
loihg-arm statute. For a discussion of a possible problem of proceeding quasi in rem when in
personam jurisdiction is available, see text accompanying notes 63-70 infra.
32. E.g., George v. Strick Corp., 496 F.2d 10, 12-13 (10th Cir. 1974) (indicating that
Oklahoma's long-arm statute extends judicial jurisdiction to the outer limits of due process "when
and only when the asserted cause of action arises from defendant's activities within the state") (em-
phasis in original); Whisenant v. Whisenant, 219 Kan. 387, 548 P.2d 470 (1976). Cf. Worland v.
Worland, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d 981 (1976) (statutory grant ofjurisdiction does not include power
to issue final order regarding child custody); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(10) (1976) (an act of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/1
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that prevents the assertion of in personam jurisdiction.33
III. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC HOLDING
The Court's language was much broader than its holding. It said:
"We ...conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must
be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny." 4 If the Court's "all" language is taken literally, the
Shaffer case will have an impact on state-court jurisdiction far beyond
its abolition of the property half of the presence-power doctrine.
The present article focuses on Shaffer's potential impact on single-
factor rules that permit courts to assert in personam jurisdiction. The
impact Shaffer may have on such rules cannot be understood without a
close examination of the Court's analysis of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
As necessary background for the discussion of post-Shaffer assertions
of in personam jurisdiction, therefore, the article examines Shaffer's
impact on the jurisdictional aspects of two earlier quasi in rem
cases-Harris v. Balk3' and Home Insurance Co. v. Dick.36  It urges
that Shaffer makes suspect all assertions of in personam jurisdiction
based solely on a single-factor analysis and that in the future "all" as-
sertions of in personam jurisdiction by state courts will be tested
against the multiple-factor requirements of International Shoe37 and
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.31
IV. THE MULTIPLE-FACTOR STANDARDS-INTERN4TION4L SHOE
AND ITS PROGENY
Under the standards developed in International Shoe and its progeny
assertions of state-court jurisdiction based on single-factor rules had to
I. Satisfy due process;
2. Be consistent with concepts of fair play and substantial justice;
3. Meet minimum contacts requirements;
sexual intercourse within the state resulting in the conception of a child allows the state to assert
jurisdiction over the parents for the purpose of determining parenthood or obtaining support pay-
ments as long as the child or the other parent continues to reside in the state).
33. Because it is the constitutional limitation on personal jurisdiction over the absent owner
that conditions a state's ability to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction, such actions will remain a useful
device in states with limited long-arm statutes.
34. 433 U.S. at 212.
35. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
36. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
37. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
38. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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4. Involve a nexus among the forum, the litigation, and the
defendant.
Until the decision in Shaffer, however, courts did not measure asser-
tions of jurisdiction under the presence-power doctrifie-in rem, quasi
in rem, in personam-against the fair play-substantial justice standard.
They were assumed to satisfy due process.
Shaffer clearly requires that assertions of jurisdiction in rem and
quasi in rem be measured against the fairness-justice standard. That
standard, however, although narrower than due process, helps very lit-
tle in deciding individual cases. It is a visceral standard by which
one's sense of injustice39 is brought into play. If the Court in Shaffer
simply held that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must meet the
test of fair play and substantial justice, its conclusion, while modifying
the presence-power doctrine, would be so general as to lack utility. A
fair reading of the Court's opinion in Shaffer, however, leads to the
conclusion that in asserting jurisdiction-in personam, in rem, and
quasi in rem-state courts in most cases must satisfy the minimum con-
tacts standard of McGee;40 and to meet that standard, there must be a
nexus among the forum, the litigation, and the defendant. 41  The tri-
partite nexus is at the heart of the Shaffer analysis,42 and the Court
seems to have intended that a forum-litigation-defendant nexus exists
as a condition precedent to most assertions of jurisdiction by state
courts. The Court indicated some areas in which the tripartite nexus
need not be present43 and took a neutral position in two situations."n
39. In his dissent in International Shoe, Justice Black objected to the adoption of the fair
play-substantial justice standard, saying: "for application of this natural law concept, whether
under the terms 'reasonableness,' justice,' or 'fair play,' makes judges the supreme arbiters of the
country's laws and practices .... This result, I believe, alters the form of government our Consti-
tution provides." 326 U.S. at 326. See also CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949).
40. 355 U.S. at 226.
41. "[T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the
mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the cen-
tral concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204. In
discussing Type 2b quasi in rem actions in which the property in the state "is completely unrelated
to the plaintiff's cause of action," the Court said: "[A]lthough the presence of the defendant's
property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and
the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction." Id. at
209. See also the quotation from Justice Brennan's opinion, note 94 infra.
42. 433 U.S. at 209.
43. See note 25 supra.
44. The Court said that the Shaffer "case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider,
the question whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. For a
discussion of the jurisdiction-by-necessity issue raised, see Vernon, supra note 25, at 1008-09. In
commenting on cases involving status questions, eg., ex parte divorce/dissolutions, the Court
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Nevertheless, it left several important questions unanswered.
V. EQUATING QUASI IN REM AND IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
In its analysis, the Shaffer Court sharply distinguished among vari-
ous types of quasi in rem jurisdiction. An understanding of these dis-
tinctions is necessary for an appreciation of the possible impact the case
will have on single-factor bases of in personam jurisdiction. The
Court established two categories of quasi in rem proceedings:
Type 1. '[T]he plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the
subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of
similar interests of particular persons.'45
Type 2. '[T]he plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the prop-
erty of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.'4 6
For analytical purposes, it is clear from the Court's discussion that
Type 2 quasi in rem cases should be divided into two classes:
Type 2a. Involving claims arising from defendant's ownership of or in-
terest in the property attached, e.g., a slip-and-fall accident on the
property attached. 47
Type 2b. Involving claims arising independently of defendant's owner-
ship of or interest in the property attached.48
For true in rem49 and Types 1 and 2a quasi in rem cases, the Court
said: "We do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as
the particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard of
fairness." 433 U.S. at 208 n.30. For a discussion of the status question, see Vernon, supra note
25, at 1005-07.
45. 433 U.S. at 199 n.17 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 207-08. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Digby, 243 Ark. 799, 422 S.W.2d 671 (1968) (decid-
ing that ownership of Arkansas land was a constitutionally sufficient contact, without other con-
tacts, to permit the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the absent owner on a claim arising out
of that ownership-an alleged breach of a contract with a broker for the sale of the land);
Chadbourn v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700,208 S.E.2d 676 (1974); Associates Fin. Servs. of Okla. v. Kregel,
550 P.2d 992 (Okla.Ct.App. 1976) (sustaining the assertion of personal jurisdiction over an absent
owner of land in a suit to foreclose a mortgage and obtain a deficiency judgment); Dubin v. City
of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1938) (sustaining the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over the absent owner of land in a "slip and fall" case allegedly caused by a
broken sidewalk in front of the property).
48. 433 U.S. at 207-08.
49. "'A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property.'" Id. at
199 n.17 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958)). While the facts in Shaffer
presented a quasi in rem problem, the Court's analysis dealt with true in rem cases as well. Id. at
207-08. For a discussion of in rem jurisdiction under Shaffer, see Vernon, supra note 25, at 1002-
05. See also Hazard, .4 General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 287-
88.
Number 2]
Washington University Open Scholarship
284 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
recognized that its overturning of the presence-power doctrine, while
changing the analytical framework, rarely would deny a state court ju-
risdiction it could have asserted prior to the Shaffer decision.5 0 The
Court recognized that it had substantially altered the results in Type 2b
cases." Two Type 2b cases are examined in depth here. In each case,
the question presented is the same: As a matter of constitutional law,
could personal jurisdiction have been asserted successfully over the ab-
sent property-owning defendant? If so, Type 2b quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion would be proper. Otherwise, the asserted quasi in rem jurisdiction
would fail.
A. Harris v. Balk
Despite the statement in Shaffer that "[f]or the type of quasi in rem
action typified by Harris v. Balk"5 2 the application of the International
Shoe standard "would result in significant change," 53 the record in
Harris is such that had the case been decided after Shaffer, the asser-
tion of quasi in rem jurisdiction might still have been sustained. As
with Pennoyer,54 the quasi in rem jurisdiction under attack occurred in
a prior proceeding. The case before the Court involved a writ of error
to the North Carolina Supreme Court in an in personam action filed
there by Balk, a North Carolina merchant, 55 against Harris, also a
North Carolinian, on a debt resulting from the alleged nonpayment of
a loan Balk had made to Harris in North Carolina.5 6 Harris defended
the North Carolina suit by claiming that, as directed by a valid Mary-
land quasi in rem judgment against Balk, he had satisfied his debt to
Balk by paying it to Epstein, a Maryland merchant and Balk's judg-
ment creditor. The issue in Harris involved the validity of the judg-
ment Epstein had obtained against Balk in Maryland. Epstein
commenced that action while Harris was temporarily in Maryland. He
had a writ of attachment served on Harris, attaching the debt Harris
owed Balk. Epstein, thus, proceeded quasi in rem on the theory that
Balk's property-the debt Harris owed Balk-was present in Mary-
land. After having been served in Maryland, Harris left the State
50. 433 U.S. at 207-08.
51. Id. at 208.
52. Id.; Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
53. 433 U.S. at 208.
54. See note 5 supra.
55. Record, at 56, Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (indicating that Balk had purchased
goods in commercial quantities from Epstein, a Baltimore merchant).
56. Record, at 22 (cross-examination of Harris).
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without contesting the garnishee process and paid the judgment. The
Harris Court rejected Balk's claim that he was not bound by the Mary-
land judgment because the Maryland court lacked jurisdiction. It ap-
plied the presence-power doctrine of Pennoyer and held that since
Balk's property was present and properly attached in Maryland, the
court had jurisdiction to issue a judgment that would bind Balk up to
the value of the property before the court. 7
Although a post-Shaffer analysis would be different from that used
by the Harris Court, the result might be similar. Epstein's claim
against Balk derived from Balk's nonpayment to Epstein for goods ap-
parently shipped from Baltimore to Balk in North Carolina. 8 Balk
may even have ordered the goods while present in Maryland.59 Re-
gardless of where the goods were ordered, it is likely that under Interna-
tional Shoe6" and McGee, 6 t Balk would be subject to the in personam
jurisdiction of the Maryland court.62 Absent other considerations,
therefore, quasi in rem jurisdiction over Balk's Maryland property
would be appropriate under Shaffer.
57. The lack of notice to Balk would seem to be a fatal defect under current standards with-
out regard to Shaffer. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
58. Record, at 46 (containing lists of goods Epstein claimed Balk had purchased from him;
the goods being consigned to Balk by "Baltimore Bargain House, Jacob Epstein, proprietor ....
216 West Baltimore Street"). Further, Balk testified that as Harris "was going off to Baltimore, I
told him to tell Jacob Epstein I would be in Baltimore soon .... " Id. at 23. Harris testified
that Balk had told him before he left for Baltimore "that if Epstein would give him a clear receipt
for his old debt, he would go to Baltimore and buy $500 or $600 worth of goods and pay
cash ...... Id. at 22. On the basis of the testimony, it seems likely that the pattern of dealing
between Balk and Epstein involved Balk selecting the goods he wanted at Epstein's Baltimore
store and Epstein shipping the goods from Baltimore to Balk in North Carolina.
59. Id.
60. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
61. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
62. See, e.g., Wichman v. Hughes, 248 Ark. 121, 450 S.W.2d 294 (1970) (sustaining the as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction over a buyer who, by agent, purchased horses in Arkansas); Parke-
Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970) (sus-
taining the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who sent a letter to plaintiff in
New York stating that he wished to bid $68,000-later increased to $71,000--for a specific paint-
ing plaintiff was planning to auction in New York; who, by telephone, arranged to have tele-
phonic communication established between himself and plaintiff during the auction in order to
participate in the bidding; for whom an employee of plaintiff monitored the telephone during the
auction; and who entered bids through plaintiff's employee while the auction was in progress);
State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968).
For a discussion of other Type 2b cases in which jurisdiction probably would exist after Shaffer,
see Vernon, supra note 25, at 1015-17; text accompanying notes 96-101 infra.
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If the events in Harris occurred after Shaffer in a state that permitted
assertions of in personam jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the
Constitution,6 3 Epstein could proceed in personam or quasi in rem. If
he proceeded quasi in rem' by service on Harris, it is possible that he
would violate a state policy against multiplicity of suits.6" Epstein's
claim against Balk exceeded $300." Balk's claim against Harris was for
$180. Since Epstein could have proceeded against Balk in personam
and prevented potential dissipation of assets by attaching Balk's prop-
erty,66 Epstein could have settled the entire matter in a single suit. By
proceeding quasi in rem, Epstein would force Balk to defend two ac-
tions rather than one, without any gain to Epstein.67 Although Epstein
would not technically be guilty of splitting his cause of action 68 by pro-
ceeding quasi in rem, he would violate the policies forwarded by rules
preventing the splitting of a cause of action. Orderly judicial adminis-
tration as well as good litigation judgment by plaintiff's counsel require
a person in Epstein's position to opt for the remedy more likely to re-
solve the dispute in a single action.69 In due process terms, Balk would
arguably be denied fair play and substantial justice if required to de-
fend the same suit twice.70
The property attached in Harris was intangible and only transiently
in Maryland-for as long as Harris remained there. Further, Harris,
rather than Balk, controlled the situs of the latter's property. Is the
assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction in Harris suspect because the
property was intangible, was in Maryland transiently, or because of the
fact that Balk did not voluntarily transport the property to Maryland?
Although Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Shaffer stated
63. See note 29 supra.
64. See note 30 supra.
65. For a discussion of modem views on multiplicity of suits, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS §§ 76-143 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
66. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 210.
67. See note 31 supra.
68. Since Epstein in his quasi in rem action would assert his entire claim, with his "remedy"
being restricted to the value of the property attached, he technically would not be splitting his
claim, only his remedy. In terms ofjudicial economy, harassment of Balk, and finality, however,
the impact would be the same. For a discussion of claim splitting in the context of res judicata
and preclusion, see generally A. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION v-7 to v-12 (1969).
69. Id.
70. One of the main due process concerns of the Court in Shaffer was the unfairness to
defendants of forcing them into a forum to defend their property when the property as such was
unrelated to the claim. It seems no less unfair to leave plaintiffs who have the power to litigate
their claims in a single action the option of forcing defendants to defend two separate actions.
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his preference for retaining the presence-power doctrine for property
"indisputably and permanently"'" in the forum, and Justice Stevens
concurred "where real estate is involved,""2 the majority opinion does
not suggest that the property's tangible nature or its transience is a
significant factor.73
Balk's lack of control over the property's presence in Maryland, how-
ever, might be significant in a similar case filed after Shaffer. The
Shaffer Court indicated indirectly74 that a state court could not assert
71. 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), held that the debt Harris owed Balk traveled with
Harris as he went from North Carolina to Maryland, ie., the situs of the debt was with the debtor.
Since then, quasi in rem jurisdiction has been asserted successfully when the debtor was present in
the forum. See, e.g., Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934) (defendant's claim
in a federal interpleader action in Texas was based on a prior quasi in rem proceeding it had
instituted in Illinois against two insurance companies who were amenable to process there, the
property attached being the claim the Texas insured had against the companies on fire insurance
pohcies covering Texas property); Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974). In escheat cases, the Supreme Court appears to have "sited" the
intangible property with the creditor in the sense that such property escheats to the state of the
creditor's last known address, assuming such state has appropriate legislation permitting such es-
cheat. Eg., Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674
(1965). And, for purposes of taxation, intangible property is treated as having a situs at the domi-
cile of the decedent whose estate is being taxed. Eg., Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949).
It would appear that the situs of intangible property depends on the purpose for which situs is to
be determined. See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 467-68, 492 P.2d 13, 16-17, 99 Cal. Rptr.
325, 328-29 (1972). Other than pointing out that the Court in Harris "limited its holding to States
in which the principal defendant (Balk) could have sued the garnishee (Harris) if he had obtained
personal jurisdiction over the garnishee in that State," 433 U.S. at 201 n. 18, the Shaffer Court did
not consider the problem of the "presence" of intangible property for purposes of quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
74. When discussing in rem and Type 1 quasi in rem cases, the Court said: "ITihe defend-
ant's claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit
from the State's protection of his interest." 433 U.S. at 207-08 (emphasis added). The Court
footnoted the word "normally" as follows: "In some circumstances the presence of property in the
forum State will not support the inference suggested in the text. Cf., e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 60 (1971), Comments c, d; Traynor, Is this Conflict Really Neces-
sarj?, 37 TEX. L. REv. 657, 672-73 (1959); Note, The Power of a State to Affect Title in a Chattel
A4typically Removedto It, 47 COLUM. L. Rav.767 (1947)." Id. at 208 n.25. Comments c and d to §
60 of the RESTATEMENT discuss limitations on jurisdiction over chattels brought into the state by
fraud (c) and without the consent of the owner (d). The portion of Justice Traynor's article cited
by the Court discusses People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal.2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957), in
which the court held that a Texas secured party would not be held to a California requirement
that secured parties make a character investigation of borrowers or forfeit the security interest if
the car financed were used for unlawful transportation of narcotics. The car had been taken from
Texas without the consent of the secured party. The Note on atypically removed chattels consid-
ers problems arising when a chattel is in a state without the consent of the owner, while in transit,
or as the result of the owner fraudulently being induced to send it to the state.
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in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over property within a state without
the owner's consent 75 or within the forum as the result of fraudulent
inducement of the owner.76 In Harris, Balk's lack of control over Har-
ris' movements did not influence the result. Yet, the distinction be-
tween lack of consent and inability to control the presence of property
in a forum seems too insubstantial to permit a constitutional distinc-
tion. The requirement in Shaffer that the defendant consent to the
presence of the property as a condition precedent to in rem and quasi
in rem jurisdiction presumably is based on an assumption of risk the-
ory, ie., by consenting to property being in the forum, the owner
"knowingly assume[s] some risk that the state will exercise its power
over ...[the] property. . . ."7 The knowing consent "gives rise to
predictable risks,"7 and thus, satisfies contemporary concepts of fair
play and substantial justice. Under this analysis, Balk's lack of control
over Harris' movements arguably would prevent Maryland from as-
serting quasi in rem jurisdiction over Balk's property even though
Maryland could assert personal jurisdiction over Balk.
The Shaffer Court emphasized the owner's consent to the property's
presence in the forum in explaining why the property's presence allows
states to assert in rem and Type 1 quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Court
said: "In such cases, the defendant's claim to the property located in
the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the
State's protection of his interest. '79 Because in Harris the property's
presence in the state was beyond Balk's control, he could not have had
any expectations of benefit from the state's protection of his property
right. In the absence of such expectations, it would seem that neither in
rem nor quasi in rem jurisdiction could be asserted successfully.
Balk's lack of control over the presence of the property in Maryland
would have no impact on Maryland's power to assert in personam ju-
risdiction over Balk; that power would arise as the result of his dealing
with Epstein in Maryland.80 And it might appear that the ability to
obtain personal jurisdiction over Balk would permit Maryland to assert
quasi in rem jurisdiction over his property or, at a minimum, to attach
Balk's property located in Maryland as part of the in personam pro-
75. See note 74 supra.
76. Id.
77. 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 207-08 (opinion of the Court).
80. See note 62 supra.
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ceeding. Although Shaffer holds that the ability to obtain personal
jurisdiction over an absent property owner is a condition precedent to
the assertion of jurisdiction over the owner's property, it does not hold
that the right to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction or to attach the owner's
property necessarily exists wherever personal jurisdiction is available.
Shaffer seems to deny states the power to assert jurisdiction over prop-
erty present in the state without the owner's consent regardless of
whether the state could proceed in personam against the owner. It
seems to require the same result when efforts are made to attach prop-
erty as an adjunct to personal jurisdiction. Proceeding in rem or quasi
in rem is accomplished by attachment8 1 and whether the action is based
entirely on the presence of the property or is an adjunct to a personal
action, the "expectation of benefit" seems to be a necessary element to
the state's power to proceed.
B. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick
Although the Shaffer Court used Harris v. Balk to epitomize the un-
desirable results produced by the presence-power doctrine, Home In-
surance Co. v. Dick82 presents an even greater example of extreme
assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction by state courts. In Dick, the
plaintiff 83 had purchased fire insurance on a tugboat from a Mexican
company that did no business in Texas, the forum. The policy,
purchased in Mexico, covered losses in specified Mexican waters, was
payable in Mexico in Mexican money, and contained a clause barring
suit "unless . . . filed within one year . . . from the date on
which ...[the] damage occurs."8 4  Dick filed a quasi in rem action
against the Mexican company more than one year after the tug was
destroyed by fire. The property attached in Texas was the Mexican
company's right of exoneration from two American companies with
whom part of the risk had been reinsured.8 5 The companies, which had
agents for service in Texas, had become reinsurers as a result of New
York-Mexican correspondence. The Texas courts granted relief to the
81. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,720 (1877). In pointing out the errors of the Oregon
court in the quasi in rem proceeding Mitchell had brought against Neff and on which Pennoyer's
title rested, the Court said: "The court below did not consider that an attachment of the property
was essential to its jurisdiction or to the validity of the sale . Id.
82. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
83. "At the time the policy was issued, when it was assigned to him, and until after the loss,
Dick actually resided in Mexico, although his permanent residence was in Teias." Id. at 403-04.
84. Id. at 403.
85. The Mexican corporation did not appear in the proceeding.
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plaintiff under a Texas statute declaring invalid contract clauses re-
stricting the right of action to a period shorter than two years.86  In
reversing, the Supreme Court held that Texas lacked sufficient contacts
with the transaction to apply its own law to deny a contract defense
valid where all of the events occurred.87
The American companies conceded-as they had to under the pres-
ence-power doctrine-that plaintiffs "inability to sue the Mexican cor-
poration in Texas, in personam . . . [was] not material . "..."88
Under Shaffer the inability to proceed in personam against the Mexi-
can company would prevent the Texas courts from proceeding quasi in
rem against the Company's property, if the property were present in
86. 281 U.S. at 404-05.
87. The impact of Dick on the choice of law powers of state courts is difficult to assess. It
clearly applies to contract cases in which the forum implements its own law to deny a defense
valid by the law of the place where the events occurred when the forum has no more than a
"slight" or "casual" contact with the events. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936); Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934). When
the contacts are more than "slight" or "casual," a state may apply local law to deny such a de-
fense. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (an insured who purchased personal
property insurance in Illinois from a British company moved to Florida thereafter and filed suit in
Florida for a loss occurring there; Florida was permitted to apply its statutory rule invalidating
contract clauses restricting the right to file suit to a period shorter than five years); Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (when the alleged injury occurred in Louisiana,
its courts were permitted to apply the Louisiana direct action statute in a suit against the insurance
company in the face of a no-direct-action clause in the policy which was negotiated and issued in
Massachusetts and delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois).
It is not clear whether Dick applies to noncontract cases. In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953), the Court was faced with a claim that a federal statute, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1975), governed the rights of a Danish seaman who joined the crew of a Danish ship in New
York and was injured during the course of his employment in Havana, Cuba. In denying the
applicability of the Jones Act, the Court said: "We have held it is a denial of due process of law
when a state of the Union attempts to draw into control of its law otherwise foreign controversies,
on slight connections, because it is a forum state." 345 U.S. at 590-91 (citing Dick and Hartford
Acc. & Indent Co., 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In another Jones Act case, Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970), Justice Harlan in dissenting from the holding that United States
law governed, said: "There must be at least some minimal contact between the State and the
regulated subject before it can, consistently with the requirements of due process, exercise legisla-
tive jurisdiction." Id. at 413 (Harlan J., dissenting) (citing Dick and Watson). Justice Brennan
indicated in his dssent to Shaffer that Dick has broad applicability as a choice of law rule: "While
consititutional limitations on choice of law are by no means settled, see, e.g., Home Ins. Co. V,
Dick, .. . important considerations certainly include the expectancies of the parties and the fair-
ness of governing the defendants' acts and behavior by rules of conduct created by a given juris-
diction." 433 U.S. at 225. But see Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487,
221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), in which Minnesota applied its own comparative negligence rule to a case
in which its only contact with the events was that the plaintiff was from Minnesota; the accident
occurred in Indiana which had a contributory negligence rule.
88. 281 U.S. at 402-03.
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Texas.89
In Dick, the forum contacts were insufficient to permit Texas to ap-
ply its own law. Texas had no "interest" in the outcome of the litiga-
tion.9  In Shaffer, the appellee argued that Delaware was an
appropriate forum9 ' because of its strong interest in the outcome of a
suit against officers and board members of a Delaware corporation
charged with wrongfully dissipating the corporation's assets.92  The
Court responded:
[E]ven if Heitner's assessment of the importance of Delaware's interest
is accepted, his argument fails to demonstrate that Delaware is a fair fo-
rum for this litigation. The interest appellee has identified may support
the application of Delaware law to resolve any controversy over appel-
lants' actions in their capacity as officers and directors. But we have re-
jected the argument that if a State's law can properly be applied to a
dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that
dispute.93
The Shaffer majority held that contacts that create an interest in a state
sufficient to permit the application of its law are not necessarily
sufficient to permit that state to assert judicial jurisdiction over a
claim.94
89. The companies argued that since the debt no longer existed, and since their only obliga-
non was to exonerate the Mexican insurance company from the debt, no property existed in
Texas, and thus, quasi in rem jurisdiction was improper. Id. at 403-04. For a discussion of some
other Type 2b cases in which quasi in rem jurisdiction was asserted prior to Shaffer, but which
would not be available at present, see Vernon, supra note 25, at 1016-17. See also Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
90. A State may, of course, prohibit and declare invalid the making of certain contracts
within its borders. Ordinarily, it may prohibit performance within its borders, even of
contracts validly made elsewhere, if they are required to be performed within the State
and their performance would violate its laws. But, in the case at bar, nothing in any way
relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or re-
quired to be done in Texas. All acts relating to the making of the policy were done in
Mexico. All in relation to the making of the contracts of re-insurance were done there
or in New York. And, likewise, all things in regard to performance were to be done
outside of Texas. Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for any
purpose, except by Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact that Dick's permanent
residence was in Texas is without significance. At all times here material, he was physi-
cally present and acting in Mexico. Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the
terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than that agreed
upon and to seize property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty
against deprivation of property without due process of law.
281 U.S. at 407-08.
91. 433 U.S. at 213-14.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 215 (footnote omitted).
94, "[The State] does not acquire ...jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the
controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not
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In a case such as Dick, in which the forum has insufficient interest to
apply its own law, may the state's courts assert judicial jurisdiction? If
so, is there any justification for permitting such an assertion? A state
barred from applying its own laws to override a contract clause valid
where the events occurred would seem to lack contacts with the litiga-
tion sufficient to permit it to assert jurisdiction under the minimum
contacts theory.95 Unless some basis other than minimum contacts
would permit post-Shaffer courts to assert jurisdiction, it is unlikely
that the forum could adjudicate the claim.
Assuming that Shaffer does not change the various single-factor ba-
ses of jurisdiction, a state court, although barred from applying its own
laws, could assert judicial jurisdiction over a claim if the defendant is
served while present in the forum,96 is a domiciliary of the forum,97
does continuing business9" or has an agent in the forum,99 or is subject
to "broad" jurisdiction under any of the other single-factor bases of
jurisdiction."i° It is anomalous that a state with a sufficient govern-
mental interest to apply its own law to the dispute may have
choice of law. It is resolved in this case by considering the acts of the [appellants]." Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (brackets in original), quotedin 433 U.S. at 215. Justice Bren-
nan, while concurring in the Court's overruling of the presence-power doctrine of Pennoyer, dis-
sented from the Court's decision that insufficient minimum contacts existed on the facts of
Shaffer to permit the assertion of in personam jurisdiction, and questioned the rigidity of the
majority's sharp distinction between choice of law and jurisdiction:
I recognize that the jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiries are not identical. Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,254 (1958). But I would not compartmentalize thinking in this
area quite so rigidly as it seems to me the Court does today, for both inquiries "are often
closely rejated and to a substantial degree depend on similar considerations." Id at 258
(Black J., dissenting). In either case an important linchpin is the extent of contacts be-
tween the controversy, the parties, and the forum State. While constitutional limitations
on the choice of law are by no means settled, see, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,...
important considerations certainly include the expectancies of the parties and the fair-
ness of governing the defendants' acts and behavior by rules of conduct created by a
given jurisdiction. See, e.g, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971) ....
These same factors bear upon the propriety of a State's exercising jurisdiction over a
legal dispute.
Id. at 224-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. See excerpt from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Shaffer, note 94 supra. There
are relatively few constitutional prohibitions on state-court powers to select the governing law in
choice of law cases. The extraterritorial due process doctrine of Dick, discussed in note 87 supra,
is one such limitation. Another constitutional limitation involves claims against fraternal benefit
societies. E.g., Order of Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). 'See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1971).
96. See note 6 smpra.
97. See note 12 supra.
98. See note 13 supra.
99. See note 15 supra.
100. See note 14 supra (defendant incorporated in the forum).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/1
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insufficient contact to permit it to assert judicial jurisdiction, while a
state barred constitutionally from applying its own law is free to assert
jurisdiction. It is at least possible-and, perhaps, likely-that as an
aftermath of Shaffer, courts in states with only a "slight or casual"''
interest in the outcome of litigation will be barred from asserting juris-
diction under the various single-factor rules used prior to Shaffer.
In considering the quasi in rem jurisdiction Delaware attempted to
assert in the Shaffer case, the Court did not regard the single factor of
the presence of defendants' property in Delaware as controlling. It
prescribed a multiple-factor test for quasi in rem jurisdiction, and
equated quasi in rem with in personam assertions of judicial power.
The presence of the property is significant under the Shaffer analysis
only because it carries with it other factors on which jurisdiction can be
based. For in rem and Types 1 and 2a quasi in rem cases, the prop-
erty's presence with the absent owner's consent will permit in personam
actions against the owner. It will also permit quasi in rem actions
against the owner's property because the presence of the property car-
ries with it a situs governmental interest in the outcome, a forum rea-
sonably convenient to litigate the issues, and facts supporting a finding
that the absent owner reasonably should have anticipated suit in the
situs courts. In Type 2b cases in which the claim is unrelated to the
property or the forum, on the other hand, the property's presence does
not carry with it the elements necessary to permit in personam jurisdic-
tion over the absent owner. We will now consider whether assertions
of in personam jurisdiction based on single factors other than presence
of property survive the Shaffer analysis, or whether they also will per-
mit jurisdiction only if the single factor involved carries with it a forum
interest, convenience of litigation, and anticipation of suit by the absent
defendant.
VI. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SHAFFER ON SINGLE-FACTOR
BASES OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
Relying on the language and analytical techniques of the Court in
Shaffer, we can only speculate on the impact of the case on existing
single-factor bases of in personam jurisdiction. Shaffer, with two nar-
row exceptions, 0 2 eliminates one-half of the presence-power doc-
trine--that the presence of property in the forum, in and of itself, is no
101. See note 87 supra.
102. See note 25 supra.
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longer an appropriate basis for the assertion of in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction. We do not know whether the personal presence portion
of the doctrine survives-whether the presence of the defendant in the
forum, no matter how transient, remains a sufficient basis for asserting
"broad" jurisdiction.
The Court concluded that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny."' 10 3 Those standards, however, are unclear. Al-
though the Court held that International Shoe and its progeny required
a nexus among the forum, the litigation, and the defendant,104 the
nexus was not required in two situations,0 5 and the Court was neutral
on the need for the nexus in two other situations: (1) proceedings to
establish status, such as ex parte divorce/dissolution suits; 0 6 and (2)
cases in which plaintiff's only available forum is a state where defend-
ant's property is located but which has no other contact with the litiga-
tion or the defendant. 107 Thus, the forum-litigation-defendant nexus
will not be required in "all" cases, but it is unclear whether it will be
required in "most" or only in "some" cases.
It seems clear that if all elements of the Shaffer analysis apply to in
personam jurisdiction, the right to assert such power will be more lim-
ited after Shaffer; and, in fact, the concept of "broad" jurisdiction will
lose its constitutional validity. Several factors suggest that the Court's
attitude toward in personam jurisdiction may have shifted: (1) Shaffer
eliminated one-half of the presence-power doctrine; (2) the Court said
that "all" assertions of state-court jurisdiction are governed by Interna-
tional Shoe; and (3) it emphasized the need for a tripartite nexus
among the forum, the litigation, and the defendant.
A. Personal Jurisdiction in General
Before discussing the single-factor bases of jurisdiction, it is impor-
tant to understand the rationale of the Shaffer Court's decision to elim-
103. 433 U.S. at 212.
104. See notes 41 & 94 supra.
105. See note 25 supra.
106. See note 44supra. See alsoIn re The Marriage of Rinderknecht, 367 N.E.2d 1128, 1134
(Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (a post-Shaffer case holding that Shaffer did not change the "domicile" rule
in ex parte divorce actions).
107. See note 44 supra.
[Vol. 1978:273
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inate the property half of the presence-power doctrine. The Court
explained:
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of 'fair play
and substantial justice' as governs assertions of jurdisdiction inpersonam
is simple and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that "[t]he
phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of
referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 56, introductory note (1971) ....
This recognition leads to the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise
of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to jus-
tify exercising 'jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.' The
standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the in-
terests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the mini-
mum contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe.'
lo
The Court recognized that the forum-litigation-defendant nexus neces-
sary for personal jurisdiction over an absent owner, and for in rem or
quasi in rem proceedings, normally will be present in the situs state for
claims deriving from ownership of property located in the forum, e.g,
in rem and Type 1 quasi in rem cases10 9 and Type 2a quasi in rem
cases. 11
0
Why is it fair and just to have such claims litigated in the situs state
while denying that state jurisdiction in Type 2b cases?111 If the
significant differences between the two situations can be identified, the
Court's perception of the general requirements of in personam jurisdic-
tion may be clarified. When competing claims to the property are at
issue, a primary reason for permitting jurisdiction is that the situs state
may be the only forum with authority to settle the dispute.' 1 2 Further,
the situs "State's strong interests in assuring marketability of property
within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution
of disputes about possession of that property would ... support
jurisdiction . . . . ' Assertions of jurisdiction in such cases also
would be supported by "the likelihood that important records and wit-
nesses will be found" in the situs state." 4  Finally, an absent defendant
108. 433 U.S. at 207 (footnotes omitted).
109. Claims to the property itself at issue. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
110. Claims stemming from the property at issue. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
111. Claims arising independently and unrelated to the property. See text accompanying
note 47 supra.
112. See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
113. 433 U.S. at 208.
114. Id. (footnote omitted). In finding that California did not have jurisdiction over Fisher
Governor, a corporate defendant, on a claim arising in Idaho, with defendant's activities in Cali-
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with an ownership or other claim to the property reasonably should
anticipate that litigation concerning such claims is likely to occur in the
situs state." 5  For in rem and Type 1 quasi in rem cases, therefore, the
existence of a forum governmental interest, the convenience of litigat-
ing the issues in the forum, and defendant's lack of surprise that owner-
ship issues are litigated at the situs, make assertions of jurisdiction fair
and just.
For Type 2a cases, the analysis varies but the elements permitting
assertions of jurisdiction are similar. Although the issues can be liti-
gated elsewhere,"I6 the situs state has a strong governmental interest in
the outcome of litigation arising from property located within its bor-
ders. In the slip-and-fall case, the situs state has an interest in the
safety of the property and in the welfare of the person injured on it.
Because the events occurred there and the witnesses are most likely
located there, the situs state is probably the most convenient forum.
Finally, it is not unfair to conclude that an absent property owner
should anticipate the possibility of suit in the courts of the situs for
fornia being limited to sales promotion by independent nonexclusive representatives, Justice Tray-
nor, for the court, stated:
The interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents . . . or in regulating the
business involved . . . ; the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense
and prosecution in one place rather than another . . . ; the ease of access to an alterna-
tive forum . . . ; the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications
... . and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant's local
activities . . . are all relevant to this inquiry [whether jurisdiction was present].
None of these considerations supports an assumption of jurisdiction in plaintiffs' ac-
tions. The causes of action did not arise out of and are not related to Fisher's activities
in this state, and none of the relevant events occurred here. . . . Evidence can be pro-
duced as easily or more easily elsewhere, and even if plaintiffs cannot secure jurisdiction
over Fisher in Idaho, they can prosecute their actions . . . as conveniently in Iowa as
here.
Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 225-26, 347 P.2d 1, 3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-4
(1959) (citations omitted). See also Traynor, Is This Conflict Realo , Necessary, 37 TEX. L. REV.
657, 658-61 (1959).
115. The Court made it clear that one of the major defects in the jurisdiction being asserted
by Delaware in the Shaffer case was the absence of a reasonable anticipation by defendants of
being sued there. 433 U.S. at 216.
116. See, e.g., Moreland v. Rucker Pharmacal Co., 59 F.R.D. 537, 540 (W.D. La. 1973) ("A
transitory action may be brought in any court of general jurisdiction wherein defendant can be
found and served. ... ); Donigan v. Donigan, 236 Minn. 516, 522, 53 N.W.2d 635, 639 (1952)
("The fundamental rule for determining whether an action is a transitory or a local one is this: If
the cause of action could have arisen in any place whatsoever it is transitory; and unless there is a
statute to the contrary, an action thereon can be brought wherever the defendant can be
found .... "); Calder v. District Court, 2 Utah 2d 309, 314, 273 P.2d 168, 171 (1954) ("Under
the common law a transitory action is one which might be tried wherever personal service could
be obtained on the defendant .... ").
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injuries incurred on or in relationship to the property. These considera-
tions satisfy the fairess-justice standard of Znternational Shoe in Type
2a cases.
As noted above, Shaffer indicates that the presence of property in a
state does not give rise to contacts sufficient to permit personal jurisdic-
tion in in rem, Type 1 quasi in rem, and Type 2a quasi in rem cases if
the property is in the state without the owner's consent.1 17 Consent to
the property's presence supports a possible finding that the absent own-
er has reason to anticipate litigation in the situs state on claims relating
to the property. The Shaffer majority clearly indicated that the ab-
sence of the owners' tacit consent was significant to its decision:
[A]ppelants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court.
Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that treats accept-
ance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction . . . And "[i]t strains
reason ...to suggest that anyone buying securities in a corporation
formed in Delaware 'impliedly consents' to subject himself to Dela-
ware's ...jurisdiction on any cause of action." 118
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion also emphasized the importance
of the defendants' lack of reason to anticipate being sued in Dela-
ware. 119 The Shaffer analysis thus appears to be based on interest,
convenience, and anticipation of suit.
In rem and Types I and 2a quasi in rem jurisdiction involve "lim-
ited" jurisdictional assertions, with the claims being directly related to
the property in the state. In Type 2b cases in which the claim arises
outside the forum and the property in the state is unrelated to the as-
serted claim, the situs court is asked to assert "broad" jurisdiction. As-
suming no purposeful impact on the forum state, the only time an
identifiable governmental interest in the forum arises in a Type 2b case
is when plaintiff is a forum domiciliary. The forum's interest may be
humanitarian1 21 or it may be to avoid burdening the forum's taxpayers
117. See note 74 supra.
118. 433 U.S. at 216 (quoting Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware:A ConstitutionalAnal-
ysir, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 749, 785 (1973)).
119. Id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. In Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup.Ct.), aff'd, 26 App. Div.
2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966), plaintiff, a guest from Ontario in a car owned and driven by an
Ontario defendant, was killed in a one-car accident in New York. Ontario's guest statute would
have barred relief, while New York's common law negligence rule would have permitted it. The
court applied New York's law. In commenting on the case, Professor Leflar said:
New York's interest in applying its own law rather than Ontario's on these issues is based
primarily on its status as a justice-administering state. In that status it is strongly con-
cerned with seeing that persons who come into New York courts to litigate facts with
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with the support of the plaintiff.121 Because all the events in this Type
2b case occurred outside the forum, problems of proof and availability
of witnesses make the forum less than convenient. It seems unfair to
find that an absent property owner reasonably should anticipate suit in
the situs state on claims unrelated to the property. Thus, if the plain-
tiff is a nondomiciliary of the forum, the three elements essential in
Shaffer are absent; even if plaintiff is domiciled in the forum, two of
the elements are lacking.
In Shaffer, the Court held that assertions of in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction depend on a court's ability to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the absent defendant. The Court's analysis, although specifically
directed at obtaining jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of prop-
erty, also applies to a state's ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over
an absent defendant. In summary, Shaffer indicates that the minimum
relationships necessary to obtain in personam jurisdiction are: (1) the
events must have contact with or impact on the forum sufficient to give
rise to a governmental interest in the forum; (2) the forum must be a
reasonably convenient place to litigate the issues raised; and (3) the
defendant must have had reason to anticipate-tacitly consent to-.the
assertion of judicial jurisdiction by the forum court.
substantial New York connection have their cases determined according to rules consis-
tent with New York's concepts ofjustice, or at least not inconsistent with them. That
will be as true for non-domiciliary litigants as for domiciliaries.
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. Rv. 1584, 1594
(1966). See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973) (on facts similar to Kell
except that the accident was in Minnesota, the court, viewing itself as a justice-administering en-
tity, applied its own common law rule in preference to Ontario's guest statute).
121. See DeAngelis v. Scott, 337 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In discussing the policy
behind the statutory prohibition against the assignment of rights to workmen's compensation
benefits, the court said:
We are speaking charitably when we state the motive for the Pennsylvania statutory rule
was the protection of the'wage earner from attachment of his wages. Other cases have
bluntly stated that the motive is the protection of the taxpayers of the Commonwealth
from the burden of supporting the destitute workman ....
Id. at 1025; Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
In applying Minnesota's comparative negligence rule rather than Indiana's contributory negli-
gence rule in favor of a Minnesota plaintiff injured in a three-truck Indiana accident, the court
said: "[Plaintiff] currently resides in Minnesota, saddled with crippling physical disabilities arising
from the collision. Thus, the economic impact of these injuries . . .will be felt by Minnesota
residents." Id. at 492, 221 N.W.2d at 668.
A forum will almost always have an interest in the welfare of a domiciliary plaintiff, but that
interest, standing alone, is not sufficient under Shaffer to permit the forum to assert its judicial
power. 433 U.S. at 215. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Lucini v. May-
hew, 113 RI. 641, 647, 324 A.2d 663, 665 (1974).
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B. The Domicile Rule
Five years before deciding International Shoe, the Court held in Mil-
liken v. Meyer1 22 that "[d]omicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring
an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for pur-
poses of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted serv-
ice."' 23 In explaining why domicile, in and of itself, is a sufficient
contact with the forum to permit assertions of broad in personam juris-
diction, the Court said:
The state which accords [the domiciliary] privileges and affords protec-
tion to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact
reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the
state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are in-
separable" from the various incidences of state citizenship. . . .The re-
sponsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the state
which domicile creates. That relationship is not dissolved by mere ab-
sence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privileges
incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the
state. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the
state even during sojourns without the state ....
Just as Pennoyer's presence-power theory ofjurisdiction relied on the
single factor of physical presence, the analysis in Milliken found the
single factor of domicile sufficient to permit assertions of "broad"
state-court jurisdiction. Shaffer rejected Pennoyer's single factor analy-
sis, and the application of Shaffer to the domicile rule seems to require
a similar rejection of domicile as a single factor permitting state courts
to assert "broad" jurisdiction over the defendant.
Assume a suit in personam against an absent domiciliary is filed by
the forum state to collect taxes it claims are due. If the state's tax claim
arises from the defendant's domiciliary status, the case is similar to the
slip-and-fall Type 2a quasi in rem proceeding considered in Shaffer.'25
In the slip-and-fall case, the claim asserted stems from property located
in the forum. In the tax case, the claim asserted stems from the exist-
ence of the domiciliary relationship. In both cases, the existence of the
single factor-property and domicile-permits the courts to act. "Lim-
ited" jurisdiction is available because in both cases there is a govern-
mental interest in the outcome, the forum is a convenient place to
122. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
123. Id. at 462.
124. Id. at 463-64.
125. See note 47 supra.
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litigate, and the defendants have reason to anticipate suits in the forum.
In both cases, tacit consent to "limited" jurisdiction is present.
Assume, however, a case is filed in the domiciliary state against an
absent domiciliary by a nondomiciliary alleging a right arising out of
an automobile accident in a state other than the forum. The case is
similar to the facts of Shaffer. In Shaffer, however, the state of incor-
poration, Delaware, had a governmental interest in the litigation. 2 6  In
the automobile hypothetical, on the other hand, it is difficult to identify
such an interest. In both Shaffer and the automobile case, tacit con-
sent to jurisdiction is absent. Just as property ownership carries with it
reason to anticipate suits in the situs state only if they involve claims to
or stemming from the property, domiciliary status only carries with it
reason to anticipate suits arising from that status.
Because the Court decided Milliken five years before International
Shoe,'27 it did not evaluate the domicile rule against the "fair play and
substantial justice" concept of International Shoe. The existence of
126. Justice Brennan, dissenting from the Court's treatment of the minimum contacts issue,
dealt with the suit as a shareholders' derivative action in which the benefits inure primarily to the
corporation rather than to the named plaintiff. He said:
Viewed in this light, the chartering State has an unusually powerful interest in insur-
ing the availability of a convenient forum for litigating claims involving a possible multi-
plicity of defendant fiduciaries and for vindicating the State's substantive policies
regarding the management of its domestic corporations. I believe that our cases fairly
establish that the State's valid substantive interests are important considerations in as.
sessing whether it constitutionally may claim jurisdiction over a given cause of action.
433 U.S. at 222-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The majority did not concede that Delaware had an interest in the litigation because of its view
that the quasi in rem nature of the action-attachment of shares of stock and stock op-
tions--controlled the kind of interest that would support jurisdiction; that is, the state interest
supporting jurisdiction must relate to the presence of the property in the state and not to the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the corporation and the defendants. Because own-
ership of shares was not a condition to being an officer or director of the corporation, the majority
viewed the defendants' ownership rights as being unrelated to their fiduciary duties. Id. at 214
(opinion of the Court).
127. InternationalShoe was decided in 1945; Milliken in 1940. In discussing the adequacy of
notice, the Court in Milliken referred to fair play and substantial justice as follows:
[The] adequacy [of substituted service] so far as due process is concerned is dependent on
whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is
reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to
be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (McDonald
v. Mabee) [243 U.S. 90 (1917)]. . . implicit in due process are satisfied.
311 U.S. at 463. The Milliken Court did not refer to the fair play-substantial justice standard in
its discussion of domicile as a single-factor jurisdictional base. The Court in International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316, quoted the "fair play and substantial justice" language of Milliken in defining the
due process requirements for in personam jurisdiction.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/1
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technical domicile' 28 frequently involves a tenuous connection with the
forum-a person in the armed forces retains the domicile existing at the
time of enlistment; 29 a person serving a life sentence in prison retains a
domicile existing at the place he or she lived immediately prior to in-
carceration;13 0 a husband who deserted his family fifteen years before
and whose whereabouts are unknown, retains his old domicile.' 3 ' It is
neither substantially just nor consistent with fair play to permit the
domicile state to assert jurisdiction over such persons when their only
contact with the forum is the existence of technical domicile. In such
situations, the reciprocal rights and duties associated with domicile
32
are unrelated to the domicile's interest in the outcome of the litigation,
the convenience of that state as a place to litigate, or the likelihood that
a defendant would anticipate being sued there. Nothing in the domi-
cile relationship calls for a departure from the tripartite nexus require-
ment of Shaffer. In functional terms-interest, convenience,
anticipation-the presence of property or domicile are substantially
identical, such that in some situations the presence of either should give
rise to "limited" jurisdiction, but neither standing alone should permit
the assertion of "broad" jurisdiction.
128. There are different kinds of domiciles recognized by the law. It is generally held
that the subject may be divided into three general classes: (1) Domicile of origin; (2)
domicile of choice; (3) domicile by operation of law. . . . The domicile of origin of
every person is the domicile of his parents at the time of his birth.
The domicile of choice is the place which a person has elected and chosen for him-
self.... Domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a
person, independent of his own intention or action ....
In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 80-81, 182 N.W. 227, 228-29 (1921). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 11-23 (1971). A person normally does not lose an existing
domicile until a new one is acquired. Id. § 19; Estate of O'Neill v. Tuomey Hosp., 254 S.C. 578,
176 S.E.2d 527 (1970).
129. See, e.g., Mayfair Sales, Inc. v. Sams, 169 So.2d 150, 152 (La. Ct. App. 1964). See
generall RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17 (1971).
130. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17, Comment c (1971). "Under the
rule of this Section, it is impossible for a person to acquire a domicile in the jail in which he is
Incarcerated. To enter jail, one must first be legally committed and thereby lose all power of
choice over the place of one's abode." Id.
131. See, e.g., Mounts v. Mounts, 181 Neb. 542, 149 N.W.2d 435 (1967) (Defendant husband
had lived in Minnesota with his wife and children for some time until May, 1950 when he deserted
his family; his whereabouts thereafter were unknown. In 1964, his wife filed an in personam
action against him in Minnesota, obtained a default judgment, and petitioned to have it registered
in Nebraska where the husband had property. The court in Nebraska held that the assertion of
jurisdiction was proper on the ground of the domicile rule coupled with the rule that an existing
domicile is not lost until a new one is acquired).
132. See text accompanying note 124 supra.Washington University Open Scholarship
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C. The Presence Rule
In the years between Pennoyer and Shaffer, in personam jurisdiction
existed in courts with subject matter jurisdiction whenever an individ-
ual defendant was served in the forum. 33 The presence-power doc-
trine of Pennoyer permitted personal jurisdiction over persons
physically within or over the forum' 34 when served, without regard to
(1) the temporary or transient nature of the presence, 35 or (2) the re-
moteness to the forum of the asserted claim. 36 Although a forum non
conveniens argument might persuade a court in an individual case to
refrain from asserting jurisdiction, 37 the court's power over the de-
fendant who was physically present when served continued to exist.
The various single-factor rules that developed after Pennoyer required
a status or other relationship with the forum that approximated physi-
cal presence, e.g., place of incorporation, continuing activities in the
forum, presence of an agent in the forum. Do conceptual and prag-
matic considerations require a different constitutional conclusion when
jurisdiction is based on the defendant's physical presence or similar re-
lationships rather than the presence of property?
i. The Transient Defendant
The presence-power doctrine permits state courts to assert jurisdic-
tion without regard to the transient naiure of the defendant's relation-
ship with the forum.' 38 If the asserted claim is unrelated to the forum
and the single factor on which jurisdiction is based is the transient pres-
ence of the defendant in the state, 39 the forum's jurisdictional claim is
weaker than one based on domicile. When domicile is the only con-
tact, at least the reciprocal rights and duties analysis of Milliken is
available. Transient physical presence does not carry with it reciprocal
obligations emphasized by the Milliken Court. While domicile may
carry with it anticipation of suit, it is less likely that transient presence
carries with it anticipation of litigation on matters unrelated to the
133. See note 6 supra.
134. Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
135. Id. See also Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A. 714 (1895).
136. See note 6 supra.
137. See, e.g., Adkins v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 54 Il. 2d 511, 301 N.E.2d 729
(1973); Cray v. General Motors Corp., 389 Mich. 382, 207 N.W.2d 393 (1973); Hadjioannou v.
Avramides, 40 N.Y.2d 929, 358 N.E.2d 516, 389 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1976).
138. See notes 134-36 supra.
139. Examples include vacationing there for a weekend or flying over the state from a point
outside the state to another point outside the state. See note 134 supra.
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presence. If the claim arose outside and had no impact on the forum it
would lack any governmental interest in the outcome and most likely
would be an inconvenient place to litigate. While a tenuous forum-
defendant nexus might be said to exist, the necessary forum-litigation
nexus and tacit consent to jurisdiction would be absent.
Shaffer requires that "all" state-court assertions of jurisdiction meet
the standards of International Shoe. 4 ° The Court held presence of
property in the forum permitted assertions of jurisdiction only if the
forum also had a nexus with both the litigation and the defendant.
Unless Shaffer is limited to jurisdiction based on the presence of prop-
erty, the validity of the transient defendant rule after Shaffer is doubt-
ful. The single factor of the defendant's transient presence in the
forum contributes nothing more than the presence of the defendant's
property in the forum contributes to the existence of a forum interest in
the outcome, the convenience of the forum as a place to litigate, or a
reason for defendant to anticipate suit there. Because it was unfair to
assert jurisdiction in Shaffer, it is unfair to assert jurisdiction in the
transient defendant case.
ii. Permanent Relationships Between the Forum and Defendant
Many relatively permanent or substantial relationships between de-
fendants and the forum have permitted assertions of "broad" jurisdic-
tion over such defendants. Thus, although the claim may have no
connection with or impact on the forum, corporations have been sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the courts in their state of incorporation;1 4 1
individual defendants have been subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
where they live-presence with 42 or without 43 domicile; and both in-
dividuals and corporations have been subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts where they have engaged in continuing activities.44 The single
factor of the substantial contact between the defendant and the forum
has permitted the assertion of "broad" jurisdiction.
It is unclear whether Shaffer will have an impact on assertions of
140. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 212.
141. See note 14 supra.
142. As a norm, an individual defendant would be served at her or his home, te., presence-
domicile combined. "Domicile is a place, usually a person's home, to which the rules of Conflict
of Laws sometimes accord determinative significance .... ." RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1971). "Home is the place where a person dwells and which is the
center of his domestic, social and civil life." Id. § 12.
143. See note 6 rupra.
144. See note 13 supra.
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jurisdiction based on such relatively permanent relationships. If the
court intended that these single-factor bases of jurisdiction must meet
the standards of International Shoe, and if those standards require a
forum governmental interest, reasonable convenience, and the defend-
ant's tacit consent to assertions of jurisdiction, Shaffer casts doubt on
such single-factor rules. It is not at all clear, of course, that Shaffer will
be read this expansively. Even if Shaffer requires all jurisdictional
claims based on single-factor relationships to meet the tripartite nexus
test, however, it does not necessarily follow that all single-factor bases
of jurisdiction are dead. In many cases in which the defendant has a
relatively permanent relationship with the forum, it is arguable that the
interest, convenience, and anticipation elements of International Shoe
and Shaffer are present and that assertions of jurisdiction are reason-
able.
When the asserted claim arises outside the forum and has no direct
impact on it, the inconvenience of litigating the suit there as to matters
of proof, availability of witnesses, and ability to view the premises are
the same as if the defendant had no connection with the forum. It is
more convenient, however, for a defendant to defend a suit at "home,"
and the Shaffer Court regarded convenience to the defendant as an
important element in its decision.'45 Although the "home" forum may
not have a direct governmental interest in the litigation's outcome, it
has a general interest in the economic health of defendants living, orga-
nized, or continually functioning in the forum, just as the plaintiff's
"home" state has a strong general interest in the welfare of plaintiffs
living, organized, or functioning in the forum. More importantly, de-
fendants should reasonably anticipate suit at "home" and may have
consented tacitly to the use of courts there to settle claims against them.
Beyond the specific requirements of Shaffer, a stable system of judi-
cial administration requires the identification of one or more states in
which a plaintiff may file suit with some confidence that the chosen
forum will have power to adjudicate the claims. If courts eliminate
permanent relationships that permitted assertion of jurisdiction in the
past and hold that Shaffer requires a forum-litigation-defendant nexus
instead, the necessary certainty arguably will be lacking.
145. See 433 U.S. at 203-04, in which the Court discusses International Shoe, and presents the
defendant's relationship with the forum as a dominant factor in the jurisdictional decision. See
also the Court's discussion of the need for the defendant to have reason to anticipate being subject
to the jurisdiction of the court as a condition precedent to the assertion ofjurisdiction. Id. at 216.
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On the other hand, it is difficult to understand why defendants
should be forced to defend in an inconvenient forum whose only con-
tact with the litigation is the defendant's relationship to it. It is also
difficult to understand why a forum should be permitted to assert juris-
diction in a case in which the forum lacks any direct governmental in-
terest. In a Dick-type situation, the forum may assert jurisdiction but
be barred from applying its own law. The "home" forum's general
interest in the defendant's welfare is equal to the interest of the
plaintiff's "home" state in the plaintiff's welfare. When a plaintiff
sues at home, the forum always has an interest, but Shaffer held that a
forum's interest in the outcome is not a dominant factor in determining
whether the forum may assert jurisdiction. 146  It is tautological to ar-
gue that "broad" jurisdiction exists in states with which defendants
have relatively permanent contacts because defendants reasonably
should anticipate the "broad" jurisdiction of courts in states with which
they have relatively permanent contacts-the anticipation of such suits
is present because of the law and the law is as it is because of the antici-
pation.1 47  Finally, it may be argued 48 that our thirty years of experi-
ence with the fair play-substantial justice standard of International
Shoe 149 and our twenty years of experience with the minimum contacts
analysis of McGee 5' provide a reasonably certain means of identifying
forums that meet those standards and remain available.
146. See note 94 supra.
147. A similar tautology has been used to establish a state's interest in low insurance rates as
an interest of significance in choice of law cases. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 566, 267
A.2d 854, 856 (1970). In Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456, 335
N.Y.S.2d 64, 68 (1972), the court discussed the tautology as follows:
The fact that insurance policies issued in this State on New York-based vehicles cover
liability, regardless of the place of the accident . . . certainly does not call for the appli-
cation of internal New York law in this case. The compulsory insurance requirement is
designed to cover a car-owner's liability, not create it; in other words, the applicable
statute was not intended to impose liability where none would otherwise exist.
See also Cipolla v. Shaposka, 539 Pa. 463, 572, 267 A.2d 854, 859 (1970) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
148. The Court in Shaffer recognized the possibility that a shift to a minimum contacts rule
might cause uncertainty. It said.
It might also be suggested that allowing in rem jurisdiction avoids the uncertainty
inherent in the International Shoe standard and assures a plaintiff a forum.... We
believe, however, that the fairness standard ofInternational Shoe can be easily applied in
the vast majority of cases. Moreover, when the existence of jurisdiction in a particular
forum under International Shoe is unclear, the cost of simplifying the litigation by avoid-
ing the jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of "fair play and substantial justice."
That cost is too high.
433 U.S. at 211 (citations omitted).
149. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
150. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).Washington University Open Scholarship
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VII. THE IMPACT OF THE ABOLITION OF SINGLE-FACTOR BASES OF
JURISDICTION
Just as one can only speculate on Shaffer's impact on in personam
jurisdiction, one can only speculate on the pragmatic effect of abolition
of "broad" jurisdiction and the substitution of a minimum contacts test
for the various single-factor bases of jurisdiction. With fewer forums
available to plaintiffs, forum shopping will be reduced. Although all
possible complications of a minimum contacts jurisdictional system
cannot be considered here, the following hypothetical cases may indi-
cate how the system may work. In addition, the hypotheticals will test
the hypothesis that fair play and substantial justice can be achieved
despite the abolition of "broad" jurisdiction.
A. The Automobile Accident
Assume a two-car accident in State X involving Alice, a plaintiff
from State X, and Bob, a defendant from State Y. Prior to Shaffer,
Alice had the option of suing Bob in X'51 or y,152 and perhaps in other
states if Bob could be served elsewhere,'1 3 had a continuing relation-
ship with another state,"54 had property in another state,155 or satisfied
one of the other single-factor bases of jurisdiction. 56 Under the
Shaffer analysis, Alice probably would be limited to a suit in X. She
would lose her power to select the forum most favorable to her cause,
i e., having more generous jurors or, perhaps, a more favorable choice
of law. 157
As the situs of the accident, X is likely to be the most convenient
forum in terms of physical evidence and witnesses. Its governmental
151. See, e.g., Berghammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1971) (Minnesota plaintiff's suit
in Iowa against an Illinois defendant for injuries resulting from an Iowa accident).
152. See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969) (in
the aftermath of a Michigan automobile accident that occurred during an intra-Michigan trip, a
New York plaintiff sought relief against a New York defendant in New York).
153. See note 6 supra.
154. See note 13 supra.
155. See note 7 supra.
156. See notes 12, 15-16 surpra.
157. While choice of law questions arising from the accident in State X are unlikely to play
an important role, it certainly is possible that a statute of limitations issue might arise if the X
statute has run and suit is filed in another state. See In re Goldsworthy's Estate, 45 N.M. 406, 115
P.2d 627 (1941). If the suit is filed in a forum which follows Minnesota's lead in applying (as a
controlling factor) the forum's interest as a justice administering entity, a comparative negligence
rule might displace X's contributory negligence rule. See Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
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interests-highway safety, humanitarian interest in the welfare of per-
sons injured in the state, avoidance of a burden on X taxpayers, protec-
tion of X medical creditors-are dominant. In addition, Bob, having
driven into X, would have reason to anticipate suit there on claims
arising from an automobile accident there. Indeed, X probably would
have a "consent' 5 8 or other statute' 59 specifically applicable to asser-
tions ofjurisdiction over nonresident motorists such as Bob. Y, having
no contacts with the events, is likely to be an inconvenient forum and
would have little interest in the litigation other than its general interest
in Bob as a resident.
If Alice lived in State Z, Xs interest would remain substan-
tial-highway safety, a humanitarian interest in the welfare of persons
injured in X, and, perhaps, a medical creditor interest. The conven-
ience-anticipation elements would be unchanged. A more difficult
case would be presented if Alice were a resident of Y, was injured in a
one-car accident in X while a passenger in a car Bob was driving on a
trip that started and was to end in Y, and X had a guest statute while Y
did not. 6 ' X remains a convenient forum to litigate the fact issues,
witnesses (other than the parties) are available, and Bob should have
anticipated suit in X for action taken there. If Xs governmental inter-
est is viewed from a choice of law perspective, X would have little or no
interest in having its guest statute govern the relationship between Al-
ice and Bob, both of whom are from Y.161 But governmental interests
for jurisdictional purposes are quite different. In making a choice of
law under modem interest theory, the interests are significant only as
they relate to the narrow issue in conflict. 6 2 For jurisdictional pur-
158. Eg., IOWA CODE § 321.498 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
The acceptance by any nonresident . . . of the privileges extended by the laws of this
state to nonresident operators or owners of operating a motor vehicle or having the same
operated, within this state shall be deemed:
1. An agreement by him that he shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the district
court of this state over all civil actions . . . for damages . . . growing or arising out of
such use and operation ....
159. Most states "deem" the use of the highways as the equivalent of designating a state
official as the nonresident's agent or attorney for service. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17451
(Deering 1972); S. C. CODE § 15-9-350 (1976); VA. CODE § 8.01-308 (1977).
160. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
161. Id. See also Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 750-51 (1963).
162. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 553-55, 432 P.2d 727, 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33
(1967):
For many years courts applied the law of the place of the wrong in tort actions regard-
less of the issues before the court, e.g., whether they involved conduct, survival of ac-
tions, applicability of a wrongful death statute, immunity for liability, or other rules
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poses, however, a state's interest relates to the entire case. When acts
occur in163 or impact on'64 a state, it has a general interest in litigation
arising out of the actions. 65 X clearly has a sufficient nexus with the
litigation and the defendant to assert in personam jurisdiction over
him.
A more difficult question is whether Y has sufficient minimum con-
tacts to act as a forum. Y's interest in the outcome of a suit brought by
one resident against another may outweigh Xs interest even though the
accident occurred in X.166 Since the trip started in Y and was to end
determining whether a legal injury has been sustained .... It was assumed that the law
of the place of the wrong created the cause of action and necessarily determined the
extent of the liability. . . . Aside from procedural difficulties. . ., this theory worked
well enough when all the relevant events took place in one jurisdiction, but the action
was brought in another. In a complex situation involving multistate contacts, however,
no single state alone can be deemed to create exclusively governing rights. . . . The
forum must search to find the proper law to apply based upon the interests of the liti-
gants and the involved states.
Ease of determining applicable law and uniformity of rules of decision, however, must
be subordinated to the objective of proper choice of law in conflict cases, i.e., to deter-
mine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue involved. . . . Moreover, as
jurisdiction after jurisdiction has departed from the law of the place of the wrong as the
controlling law in tort cases, regardless of the issue involved . . . , that law no longer
affords even a semblance of the general application that was once thought to be its great
virtue. We conclude that the law of the place of the wrong is not necessarily the applica-
ble law for all tort actions brought in the courts of this state.
See also Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., 258 N.W.2d 317, 325-26 (Iowa 1977)
(applying the rules of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) to the issue of
the validity of an arbitration clause in a commercial contract); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
477-78, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1963).
163. See note 17 supra.
164. See note 19 supra.
165. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Buckeye Boiler Co.
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899-900, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969); Gray v.
American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 444, 176 N.E.2d 761, 767 (1961).
166. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,482, 191 N.E.2d 279,284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,750
(1963). In Babcock, a New York host took a New York guest on a trip to Ontario that started and
was to end in New York. The plaintiff guest was injured in a one-car accident in Ontario, which
had a guest statute. New York's law called for the application of ordinary negligence rules and in
holding that New York's law applied, the court said:
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New York and Ontario in
this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it clear that the concern of New
York is unquestionably the greater and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at
best minimal. The present action involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the
result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile, garaged,
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there, Bob should have anticipated suit in Y for injuries he might
inflict on his passenger during the trip, wherever the injuries were suf-
fered. Y may not be as convenient a forum as X on issues of physical
evidence and availability of nonparty witnesses, but the jurisdictional
requirement is only that the forum be a reasonably-not necessarily the
most- convenient forum. 167  For the parties, the convenience of liti-
gating at "home" may outweigh whatever convenience litigation in X
offers. It seems likely that Y could assert in personam jurisdiction,
although the certainty that such jurisdiction would be sustained on a
presence or domicile theory is weaker after Shaffer.
The facts of Dym v. Gordon 168 present another possibility. In Dym,
New York asserted jurisdiction in a suit filed by a New York plaintiff
against a New York defendant (driver of a car registered in New York)
for injuries received in Colorado while plaintiff was riding in defend-
ant's car on a trip that began and was to end in Colorado. Although
Colorado had jurisdiction, 69 the post-Shaffer power of the New York
courts to assert jurisdiction is doubtful even though New York's gov-
ernmental interest is as strong as it would be if the Colorado trip had
started and was to end in New York. 170 The convenience or inconven-
ience of New York as a forum also is the same as if the trip started and
was to end there. It is difficult, however, to find that the defendant
licensed and undoubtedly insured in New York, in the course of a week-end journey
which began and was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with
the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there.
New York's policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries
caused by his negligence cannot be doubted-as attested by the fact that the Legislature
of this State has repeatedly refused to enact a statute denying or limiting recovery in such
cases-and our courts have neither reason nor warrant for departing from that policy
simply because the accident, solely affecting New York residents and arising out of the
operation of a New York based automobile, happened beyond its borders. Per contra,
Ontario has no conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against his
New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of conduct which was tortious
under Ontario law.
167. In a system where minimum contacts sufficient to support assertions of in personam
jurisdiction may exist in more than one state, it follows necessarily that jurisdiction is not limited
to the most convenient forum. In the dissenting portion of his opinion in Shaffer, Justice Bren-
nan makes the point that the concern in determining whether jurisdiction has been asserted fairly
is that "minimum" contacts exist, not that the "best" contacts are present. 433 U.S. at 228 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
168. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
169. See note 151 supra.
170. New York's humanitarian interest would be the same, as would its interest in avoiding
the imposition of an unnecessary burden on New York taxpayers. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d
120, 129-30, 209 N.E.2d 792, 797-98, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 470-71 (1965) (Fuld, J., dissenting). See
also notes 120-21 supra.
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should have anticipated suit in New York as the result of an accident in
Colorado on a trip that began and was to end in Colorado.
Can the absence of anticipation be provided by a consent statute
under which persons registering their vehicles in New York consent to
the jurisdiction of its courts in suits stemming from the operation of the
vehicle, wherever the accident occurred? Or could the anticipation el-
ement be provided by a similar statute as to persons licensed by New
York to drive? In Shaffer, the Court suggested that a consent statute
might provide the necessary anticipation of suit: "[A]ppellants had no
reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court. Delaware, un-
like some States, has not enacted a statute that treats acceptance of a
directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State."' 7 1 While a consent
statute may provide a basis for finding that a defendant had reason to
anticipate suit in the state, it cannot create an interest in a state where
none exists, nor can it make the state a more convenient place to litigate
than it is. Single-factor bases of jurisdiction cannot be reinstituted by
legislation that declares, for example, that all domiciliaries of the state,
all corporations incorporated in the state, or all corporations having
their principal office in the state "consent" to the "broad" jurisdiction
of the state's courts. Consent statutes, at most, can clarify the anticipa-
tion element necessary for constitutional assertions of jurisdiction.
The other conditions precedent-interest and convenience-are be-
yond the state's legislative powers.
In view of the uncertainty of jurisdiction in automobile accident
cases arising outside the forum but involving residents of the forum,
legislatures should seriously consider enacting vehicle registration or
driver licensing 172 consent statutes. Such statutes might permit courts
to find that the defendant had reason to anticipate suit in the forum,
and thus provide at least one of the conditions precedent to judicial
jurisdiction.
B. The Products Liability Case
Assume that (1) Alyse Alternator Company, incorporated in State X',
171. 433 U.S. at 216. Delaware's response to Shaffer was to enact a consent statute under
which accepting election or appointment to the board of a Delaware corporation will be deemed a
designation of a state official as the director's agent for service on claims relating to corporate
activities. DEL CODE tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1978).
172. "[J]urisdiction can be acquired in a motor vehicle negligence suit based solely on the
defendant's status as a New Jersey licensed driver of a New Jersey registered motor vehicle at the
time of the accident." Guas v. Guas, 146 N.J. Super. 541, 546, 370 A.2d 91, 94 (1977).
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manufactures miniature alternators at its plant in State Z and ships
them directly or through wholesalers located in State X to retailers in
all fifty states; (2) Bob, a domiciliary of State V, is injured in V by the
explosion of one of the miniature alternators he bought there.
Under the various single-factor rules in force before Shaffer, Bob, in
a suit against Alyse, could select a variety of forums-X as the place of
incorporation, 173 and any state in which Alyse had property, 174 carried
on continuing business activities,175 or had appointed an agent for serv-
ice. 176  In addition, under a long-arm statute coextensive with the Con-
stitution, Bob could sue in Z (place of manufacture) because Alyse
acted there, 177 and in V (place of injury) because Alyse purposefully
caused an effect there. 178  Both forums would be reasonably conven-
ient: the manufacturing process is centered in Z and the injury oc-
curred in V. Both states have interests in the outcome: Z in the safety
of products manufactured there and V in its residents' welfare and the
safety of products used there. Because Alyse shipped alternators na-
tionally, it should anticipate suit wherever its products cause injury as
well as where it manufactures the product.
If V has a relatively limited long-arm statute and Alyse's distribution
system involves Alyse only indirectly in the shipment of alternators to
V, it is entirely possible under a Shaffer analysis that Alyse would not
be subject to the jurisdiction of V's courts. 179 The only forum available
to Bob may be Z, the state in which the alternator was manufac-
tured.' Before Shaffer, even with a limited long-arm statute, juris-
diction might have been available in V if Alyse engaged in continuing
activities in V, regardless of whether the activities were related to Bob's
173. See note 14 supra.
174. Eg., Steele v. G. D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 415 U.S.
958 (1974).
175. Eg., Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973).
176. See note 15 supra.
177. Eg., In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (suit
against manufacturer at place of manufacture).
178. Eg., Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974); Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1969); Pust v. Union
Supply Co., 561 P.2d 355 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961); A.F. Briggs Co. v. Starrett Corp., 329 A.2d 177 (Me. 1974);
John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chain Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664 (1971); Deutsch v.
West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wash. 2d 707, 497 P.2d 1311, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Stevens
v. White Motor Corp., 77 Wis. 2d 64, 252 N.W.2d 88 (1977).
179. See, e.g., Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24 (1975); O'Brien
v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
180. See note 177 supra.
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mishaps. After Shaffer, a long-arm statute that does not permit suit in
the place of injury seems unduly restrictive. Since the lack of jurisdic-
tion results from a state law bar rather than a constitutional inhibition,
the problem may be remedied by the enactment of state legislation ex-
tending the long-arm statute to the extent permitted by the Constitu-
tion.181
C. The Airplane Crash
Assume that (1) on a cross-country flight from State X to'State Z a
commercial airliner crashed in State Y; (2) the airline was incorporated
in State Mf and engaged in continuing business activities in twenty
other states; (3) the plane manufacturer was incorporated in State 0,
had its principal office in State P, manufactured the plane in State Q,
and had sales offices and repair facilities in forty-three other states; (4)
the company that provided the plane's engines was organized in State
R, had its main manufacturing plant in State S, and had plants that
manufactured parts for the engine in six other states; (5) passengers on
the plane, all of whom were killed, came from nine different states,
purchased tickets in twelve different states, and left survivors in fifteen
different states; (6) suits on behalf of the passengers' estates and the
survivors were filed against the airline, the manufacturer of the plane,
and the manufacturer of the engines.
Shaffer will reduce substantially the number of available forums.
Thus, suit will not be permitted in states whose only contact with the
events and parties is the existence of one of the traditional single-factor
bases of judicial authority. Yet plaintiffs may select from among a
large number of prospective forums-the place of the crash (y),' 2 the
place where the flight originated (X),'8 3 the places where the plane and
181. See note 29 supra.
182. E.g., Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.Ga. 1971) (sustaining jurisdiction in a
suit by a Florida plaintiff against the administrators of a deceased Tennessee pilot for injuries
resulting from an air crash in Georgia, with Georgia's only contact being the fact that the plane
crashed there); Texair Flyers v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973) (sustaining
jurisdiction over a Texas corporation and a nonresident personal representative of a deceased
Texas pilot whose alleged negligence caused the plane to crash in Colorado on a flight from Texas
to Colorado; the court sustained jurisdiction on the basis of the single factor of the commission of
a tort in Colorado).
183. There does not appear to be a case in which jurisdiction has been asserted solely on the
basis of a flight having originated in the forum. Assertions of jurisdiction in such forums are
based on a combination of contacts of which the fact that the forum was the place the flight
originated is only one. E.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (a Massachusetts crash on a trip that originated in New York, with the dece-
[Vol. 1978:273
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the engines were manufactured (Q and S), 184 and the place where indi-
vidual passengers purchased tickets.'85 The problems of consolidating
the suits filed by the multiple plaintiffs remain. Shaffer neither exacer-
bates the consolidation problem nor unreasonably limits plaintiffs' op-
tions.
D. The Shaffer Case-Multiple Defendants
Shaffer itself raises the issue of its impact on the problem of multiple
defendants. In Shaffer, plaintiff-appellee filed suit in Delaware
against Greyhound Corporation, incorporated in Delaware and having
its principal place of business in Arizona; Greyhound Lines, Inc., a
California corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona
and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Greyhound Corporation; and
twenty-eight present and former officers and directors of one or both of
the corporations. The shareholders' derivative suit alleged that the in-
dividual defendants had violated their duties to Greyhound Corpora-
tion
by causing it and its subsidiary to engage in actions that resulted in the
corporations' being held liable for substantial damages in a private anti-
trust suit [$13,146,090 plus attorneys fees] and a large fine in a criminal
contempt action [$100,000 against the parent and $500,000 against the
subsidiary]. The activities which led to these penalties took place in Ore-
gon. 1
86
The action against the individual defendants, all of whom resided
outside of Delaware, was quasi in rem by means of a sequestration
order against stock and stock options allegedly owned by the individual
defendants and located in Delaware under a statute establishing Dela-
ware as the situs of all shares of stock in a Delaware corporation.8 7
Of the twenty-eight named individual defendants, nineteen owned
dent's ticket purchased in New York); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 4, 203 A.2d
796, 799 (1964) (a Colorado crash of a Pennsylvania to Arizona flight, with round-trip ticket
purchased in Pennsylvania and the defendant regularly doing business in Pennsylvania and main-
taining operating facilities there). The state in which a flight originates has contacts with the
events, has a strong interest in the safety of flights starting there, would be reasonably convenient
as a place to litigate a portion of many such cases-when the condition of the aircraft is at is-
sue--and would seem to be a place in which the airline reasonably should anticipate being sued.
184. See note 177 supra.
185. Eg., Benjamin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 17,286 (N.D. Il. 1971).
186. 433 U.S. at 190 (footnotes omitted).
187. Id. at 192 n.9 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1975)). The plaintiff identified
the property he sought to sequester as including more than shares of stock and stock options, but
the Court noted that the shares and the options were the only property attached. Id.
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shares and two held stock options.' If defendants wished to defend
on the merits, Delaware law required that they enter a general appear-
ance.'
89
Had the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction been sustained in.
Shaffer, plaintiff-appellee would have had jurisdiction over more than
$1,000,000 worth of property owned by twenty-one of the twenty-eight
named individual defendants. Even if the twenty-one who owned the
property came in to defend, plaintiff would have lacked jurisdiction
over the other seven defendants.
Shaffer's abolition of "broad" jurisdiction and the single-factor bases
of jurisdiction would seem to have a relatively minor impact on
plaintiff's ability to identify a single forum in which to sue multiple
defendants. Both before and after Shaffer, the effort to find a single
forum called for a minimum contacts analysis. Thus, if multiple de-
fendants from across the country or world purposefully cause an effect
in a single state by their joint actions, that state would have in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the defendants if the minimum contacts test
were met. 190 In the absence of such concerted and purposeful action, a
plaintiff's search for a single forum in which to assert a claim against
multiple defendants remains, as it was before Shaffer, a difficult, and
at times, impossible task. Shaffer may make it slightly more difficult
because national corporations engaged in continuing activities in all
states were subject to jurisdiction in all states before Shaffer. Forum
selection, therefore, could concentrate on other defendants not as read-
ily subject to the jurisdiction of state courts. Further, joint owners of
property could be brought before the courts in a Type 2b quasi in rem
action now barred by Shaffer. Overall, however, Shaffer's impact on
multiple defendant cases will be slight.
VIII. MINIMUM CONTACTS AND SH,4FFER v HiEITNER
The impact of Shaffer on the minimum contacts theory is uncertain.
In holding that inadequate minimum contacts existed to permit the as-
sertion of in personam jurisdiction over the absent officers and direc-
tors, and thus over their property, the Court in Shaffer said:
1. Delaware's sequestration statute "evinces no special concern"'19
188. Id. at 192.
189. Id. at 195 n.12.
190. See cases cited in notes 19 & 178 supra.
191. 433 U.S. at 214.
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with actions of corporate fiduciaries, but rather applies generally to
persons owning property located in Delaware, thus demonstrating
some absence of legislative interest in sequestration as a means of con-
trolling corporate fiduciaries. 192
2. Even if plaintiff-appellee is right that Delaware has a strong in-
terest in the outcome of the litigation and in the conduct of corporate
fiduciaries of Delaware corporations sufficient that it would be appro-
priate to apply Delaware law, that interest "does not demonstrate that
appellants have 'purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State,'. . . in a way that would
justify bringing them before a Delaware tribunal. Appellants have sim-
ply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware."' 193
3. "[A]ppelants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Dela-
ware court. Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute
that treats acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the
State. And '[i]t strains reason. . . to suggest that anyone buying se-
curities in a corporation formed in Delaware "impliedly consents" to
subject himself to Delaware's ...jurisdiction on any cause of ac-
tion.' "I" Appellants were not required to own shares in order to hold
their positions as officers and directors, and the fact that they did buy
shares did not function to subject them to the jurisdiction of the
Delware court.1 95
4. The assertion of jurisdiction by Delaware is inconsistent with the
constitutional limitation stated in International Shoe that due process
"'does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment...
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has
no contacts, ties, or relations.' "196
In its minimum contacts analysis, the Shaffer majority considered as
controlling the fact that jurisdiction had been asserted under the Dela-
ware sequestration statute. The Court found that defendants, as non-
resident property owners, had no reason to anticipate suit in Delaware
on matters unrelated to their property; to have no "contacts, ties, or
relations" with Delaware that related to the litigation.
If we accept that the only relationship between the defendants and
Delaware was the defendant's ownership of property located there, the
192. Id.
193. Id. at 215.
194. 433 U.S. at 216 (quoting Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: 4 Constitutional
A4nalysis, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 785 (1973)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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majority's analysis of minimum contacts is reasonable and consistent
with its general analysis of Type 2b quasi in rem actions. Although it
"strain[s] reason" to conclude that persons owning property in Dela-
ware should anticipate suit there on matters unrelated to their property
ownership, it does not strain reason to conclude that directors and
officers of a Delaware corporation should anticipate suit there for al-
leged violations of their fiduciary duty to the corporation. While Del-
aware as the situs of the shares of stock may not have a substantial
interest in breaches of fiduciary duty to a Delaware corporation, as the
place of incorporation it has a relatively strong interest in such
breaches. In dissent, Justice Brennan treated the relationship between
the defendants and Delaware as deriving from their status as officers
and directors and not as stemming from their status as property own-
ers. 1 97 He had little difficulty then in finding that constitutionally per-
missible minimum contacts existed on the facts of Shaffer. 198  A
majority of the Court might have agreed with him had the Justices
looked beyond the sequestration base on which jurisdiction was as-
serted to recognize the factual relationship between the defendants and
the forum.
It is difficult to predict the impact, if any, Shaffer will have on mini-
mum contacts analysis in the future. The majority and the dissent
seem to disagree not on the minimum contacts analysis but on the rela-
tionship controlling that analysis. By failing to deal with the reality of
the relationship between the defendants and the forum, the majority
may have signaled an intention to preclude the more extreme assertions
of in personam jurisdiction by state courts;1 99 alternatively, it simply
may have been persuaded that jurisdiction asserted under a specific
sequestration statute properly should be dealt with only under that stat-
ute.
197. I, therefore, would approach the minimum-contacts analysis differently than does
the Court. Crucial to me is the fact that appellants voluntarily associated themselves
with the State of Delaware, "invoking the benefits and protections of its laws," Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319, by
entering into a long-term and fragile relationship with one of its domestic corporations.
They thereby elected to assume powers and to undertake responsibilities wholly derived
from that State's rules and regulations, and to become eligible for those benefits that
Delaware law makes available to its corporations' officials.
Id. at 227-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 222-28.
199. E.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977),
rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978); ABKCO Indus. v. Lennon, 52 App. Div. 2d 435, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781
(1976).
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IX. CONCLUSION
If the prognosis presented above is, accurate-that "broad" jurisdic-
tion no longer exists and that all assertions of in personam jurisdiction
must be tested in a minimum contacts framework-the most difficult
problem we face may be to persuade judges and lawyers to adjust their
thinking about jurisdiction. Legislatures may have to enact some
"consent" statutes and broaden long-arm statutes. Plaintiffs will have
to be more careful in selecting a forum, but forum shopping, while re-
duced somewhat, remains available as a litigation weapon. If the
Court intended to restrict access to courts under the minimum contacts
theory, a careful analysis must be made of the cumulative effect of the
double restriction on jurisdiction.
The conclusions reached in this article are speculative. Although
they do not follow necessarily from the Shaffer holding, the Court's
conclusion that "all" assertions of jurisdiction by state courts "must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny " ' is very broad. The post-Shaffer judicial system con-
templated herein is a more rational system than we have had in the
past. It is difficult to justify a system that permits litigation in an in-
convenient forum having no interest in the outcome, and in which de-
fendant has no reason to anticipate suit. With a system in which all
assertions of jurisdiction are tested against an interest-convenience-an-
ticipation standard, the unreasoned chaos of the past can be eliminated,
forum shopping reduced, and an orderly and evenhanded system of
judicial jurisdiction established.
X. ADDENDUM
In Kulko v. Superior Court,2" ' its first post-Shaffer state-court juris-
diction case, the Supreme Court made clear that the existence of a
strong forum-plaintiff nexus coupled with a strong forum-governmen-
tal interest will not overcome the absence of a forum-defendant nexus.
The Court invalidated California's assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a New York father in a suit for child support in which the father's
only contact with California was the payment of one-way air fare for
his daughter to fly there from New York so that the child, at her re-
200. 433 U.S. at 212.
201. 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978).
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quest, could live with her mother during the school year. The Court
said:
It cannot be disputed that California has substantial interests in pro-
tecting resident children and in facilitating child-support actions on be-
half of those children. But these interests simply do not make California a
"fair forum," Shaffer v. Heitner,. . . in which to require appellant, who
derives no personal or commercial benefit from his child's presence in
California and who lacks any other relevant contact with the State, either
to defend a child-support suit or to suffer liabilty by default.
202
202. Id at 1701. See also notes 11, 141-50 & 199 supra; text accompanying notes 141-50
supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss2/1
